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DETERMINANTS OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING 
 
The aim of this paper is to determine the factors that drive banks’ 
decisions to provide loans to small informationally opaque enterprises. This 
paper combines three important aspects related to small business lending – 
asymmetry of information, bank efficiency, and regional economic performance – 
and hopes to establish the complex ties between them and understand how 
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Small business has become an important research topic for economists 
and policymakers working on economic development and regional growth. Its 
importance and significance is due to the fact that small businesses are the 
fundamental basis for building a competitive environment, as well as the basis for 
forming a middle class society. The small business sector provides flexible and 
fast satisfaction of consumer needs; it serves as an effective tool for resolving 
social and economic problems both at national and regional levels. Small 
businesses create 50% of GDP1, provide jobs for more than half the population 
of Western Europe and the U.S.2, make a significant contribution to the export 
potential, facilitate implementation in manufacturing the latest achievements of 
science and technology, and so on.  
The role of financing is particularly important in supporting small firms. 
“SMEs tend to be more financially constrained than large firms and the lack of 
access to finance is an important obstacle to their growth. In particular, SMEs 
find it difficult to obtain external financing from banks and capital markets given 
their size and characteristic opaqueness.3” Banks financing SMEs face difficult 
financial constraints due to the lack of accurate reliable information on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “The Small Business Share of GDP, 1998-2004, Kathryn Kobe, Small Business Research 
Summary, 2007. 
2 Ayyagari, Meghana, Thorsten Beck, and Asl Demirg-Kunt (2007), “Small and Medium 
Enterprises across the Globe”, Small Business Economics 29:415-434. 
3 Drivers and Obstacles to Banking SMEs: The Role of Competition and the Institutional 











financial condition and performance of small firms. In particular, banks usually 
hesitate to finance startups and young firms, those with insufficient collateral, or 
firms which demonstrate the possibilities of high returns but at a significant risk of 
loss. Despite efforts by financial institutions and public-sector bodies to close 
funding gaps, SMEs continue to experience difficulty in obtaining needed capital 
(K. Dietrich, 2003).  
The aim of this paper is to determine the factors that drive banks’ 
decisions to provide loans to small informationally opaque enterprises. This 
paper combines three important aspects related to small business lending – 
asymmetry of information, bank efficiency, and regional economic performance – 
and hopes to establish the complex ties between them and understand how 
banks can use the information available for the benefit of SMEs, and ultimately 
regional growth. 
In regard to the first aspect, the lack of hard information about SMEs 
creates asymmetry of information between banks and small enterprises. For 
example, “a lack of audited financial statements prevents banks from engaging in 
what is known as financial-statement lending, by which the loan contract terms 
are set on the basis of the company’s expected future cash flow and current 
financial condition as reflected in audited statements” (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
Other lending technologies, such as business credit scoring, asset-based lending, 
and factoring, also need hard information on the SMEs. Therefore, it is important 










for measured entrepreneurial performance when it is difficult to get hard 
information on them.  
Specifically, this paper tests hypotheses about the effect of 
entrepreneurial information regarding firm turnover available in the region and 
small business density on the amount of lending to small businesses. This paper 
tries to find out whether the information that banks can get about the number of 
firms established in the particular county and the number of closeouts per county 
influence the distribution of loans to SMEs in a particular county. Thus, banks 
can make their lending decisions knowing already the history of successes and 
failures of small businesses in a particular county and in particular industries. 
This gives them more insight on the level of lending risk in the county and 
answers the question of whether a particular sector or industry in this county can 
be successful. 
Also, along with entrepreneurial information in the region, the economic 
conditions in a particular county matter. For example, a county with a high 
income, population, and level of human capital has a higher probability of being 
more business active than the counties with these characteristics being low.   
Furthermore, bank financial distress may be an important determinant of 
loan availability. “Healthy” banks are better able to provide loans to young, small 
firms with risky projects than are less healthy banks. These banks’ profits are 










these factors need to be taken into account when analyzing bank lending to 
SMEs.   
Another issue that this paper examines is the relationship between the 
degree of small bank competition in local geographic banking markets and the 
total volume of small business lending in those markets. This paper tests whether 
increases in competition in a banking market would be expected to be associated 
with increases in small business loan volume in a county. 
The novelty of this paper lies in the regional character of the modeling. 
This paper is going to investigate how factors and their influence on the small 
business lending change across different geographical levels. Specifically, we 
will split the geography down to metro, micro, and rural counties in order to 
uncover the effect of the size and geography factor in the small business lending. 
This data split allows us to find out whether the factors that influence SME 
lending in metro counties will have the same impact on the lending practices in 
the rural counties and vice versa.  
This research tries to shed light on all these issues through testing the 
hypotheses using a rich data set provided by the Federal Reserve Bank. It 
contains information on counties’ economic conditions, entrepreneurship density, 
their loans, and the Call-report data for all banks across the regions. In all, the 
hypotheses are tested using US county data from 1999–2007, representing a 










Section 2 reviews the problem of asymmetry of information, the role of the 
bank competition, and bank distress-related problems in small business lending. 
Section 2 also reviews the existent empirical literature that is related to our 
research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data set and presents the 
methodology used to test hypotheses.  Section 4 presents our empirical findings, 
































2. Literature Review 
 
One of the issues in this paper is to study the problem of information 
asymmetry and its effect on small business lending. Consider the market where 
two qualities of a good are offered. Buyers and sellers in the same manner 
arrange their preferences in terms of products of varying quality, but only sellers 
know the quality of each individual good; buyers in the best case know only the 
distribution of the quality of previously sold goods.  If buyers cannot in any way 
distinguish good goods from bad goods, then, along with high-quality products, 
they will always find bad-quality products as well. Such a market is an illustration 
of the problem of adverse selection, and was introduced by Akerlof in his paper 
“The Market for Lemons.” He analyzed a market where buyers are unable to 
distinguish between high-quality and low-quality used cars—lemons. Also, 
Akerlof showed that the same problem arises in credit markets. Taking into 
account the problem of adverse selection, the main instinct of every bank official 
is to try not to lend to the firm that may be low-quality, that is firms in which the 
bank lacks a sufficient amount of information about its credibility.  
This paper tries to find out how banks can overcome the problem of 
informational asymmetry when lending to local small businesses or even to start-
up companies. The research focuses on regional bank lending, trying to explain 










well as, what factors can influence this geographic asymmetry of small loans 
distribution.   
A similar problem was discussed previously in the paper of Lang and 
Nakamura “The Model of Redlining” (1993). This paper shows how information 
externalities can lead to inefficient credit rationing in low-volume markets. They 
develop a model of mortgage redlining, which captures the dynamic information 
gathering4. This is implied by the use of appraisals in mortgage granting. In their 
model, the precision of appraisals depends on the quantity of previous home 
sales. In a neighborhood with a large number of recent home sales, bank 
appraisals are more precise than in the neighborhood with few recent home 
sales. Lenders require larger down payments in the neighborhood with 
inaccurate appraisals. There is thus a dynamic information externality in which 
past purchases influence current purchases. What this shows is in markets with a 
greater amount of previous information available regarding economic activity, 
there is also a greater volume of loan origination in that geographic area.  Banks 
and lending institutions see this previous information regarding economic 
success and failure as a signal for loan determination. 
This notion of information externality was extended further by Michael Barr 
(2005). In his paper, he had shown how information externalities can produce 
credit constraints that affect creditworthy borrowers in “thin” markets. He defines 
“thin” markets as markets with a relatively lower level of economic activity. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “The model of redlining”, Lang William W., Nakamura Leonard I., Journal of Urban Economics, 










showed that borrowers in low-income neighborhoods find it more difficult to 
obtain mortgage loans in part because lenders lack sufficient information on 
home sales in these “thin” markets. He has also explained how these 
informational problems can lead to a situation where creditors delay entry into 
low-income markets. Moreover, “neighborhood externalities exacerbate these 
barriers, as do agency problems in financial institutions and in the market more 
broadly. Low-income markets can become stuck, with low volume and liquidity 
blocking creation of a complete market.5” 
This paper proposes a similar dynamic externality in the context of SMEs 
funding decisions. It attempts to find available information that can be used by 
banks as a proxy for measured credibility and riskiness of informationally opaque 
SMEs. Specifically, this paper tests hypotheses about the effect of 
entrepreneurial information regarding firm turnover available in the region on the 
amount of lending to small businesses.  In this research we are using births (new 
firm opening), deaths (firms that went out of business), and the SME density as a 
proxy for variables that may reduce informational asymmetry in the region and 
help bank analysts to make decisions in their lending practices. 
Another important question related to the problem of small business 
lending is which kind of banks do in fact lend to small firms. Many articles have 
been written regarding the impact of a bank size on the amount of loans given to 
small firms. For instance, there are many papers aimed to study effects of bank 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  











consolidation through studying the role of the size of the bank in providing loans 
to small businesses. Economists monitored the lending activity of banks before 
acquisitions and after to find out how the size of the bank is correlated with 
lending to SMEs. Avery and Samolyk (2004), Sapienza (2002), Berger (2001), 
Levonian and Soller (1996) concluded that larger banks are less likely to provide 
small business loans than banks with less capital. The main argument for this is 
that small banks are able to lend to small businesses at a lower cost than large 
banks. If larger banks suffer from higher costs of making relationship loans, then 
the new bank formed by the merger or acquisition should give fewer small 
business loans after the consolidation. Consistent with this prediction, Berger et 
al. (1998) found that “after a merger, the new bank originates fewer small 
business loans than the independent banks prior to the merger.”  According to 
Berger, “Small banks have comparative advantages in lending to the smallest, 
least informationally transparent firms using lending technologies based primarily 
on ‘soft’ qualitative information, while large banks tend to specialize in lending to 
larger firms using technologies based more on ‘hard’ quantitative information.” 
Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge in their research also suggest that small banks 
have an information advantage in evaluating credit.  Also, Nakamura (1994) 
suggests that “small banks appear best able to lend to local small businesses 
because small banks have the ability to closely monitor these firms, and their 










informational advantage.6”  All these results are consistent with the research 
presented by Petersen and Rajan (1995). They showed that asymmetry of 
information induces banks to build relationships with the borrowers. These 
relationships increase credit availability, in particular to the youngest and 
informationally opaque borrowers7.  
Banking concentration is another issue related to small business lending.  
There are two countervailing hypotheses about the influence of banking 
competition on the amount of SME lending. A first hypothesis suggests that 
banks with market power should guarantee more industry entry and more SME 
loans than competitive banks. According to Cetorelli, lending to small opaque 
firms requires that the bank and the borrower build a long-term relationship. 
However, “banks can sustain the cost of starting a relationship with unknown, 
risky entrepreneurs only if market power allows them to recoup the cost at later 
stages if such entrants turn out to be successful.” This idea was tested by 
Petersen and Rajan, who argued that banks with greater market share can get a 
high enough profit from high-quality borrowers to offset losses from small opaque 
businesses. Therefore, this suggests that banks with market power should 
guarantee more industry entry and larger amount of loans to SMEs than 
competitive banks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Nakamura, Leonard I., 1994.  "Small Borrowers and the Survival of the Small Bank: Is Mouse 
Bank Mighty or Mickey?," Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review, 
November/December, 3-15. 
7	  Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. (1995), ‘The effect of credit market competition on lending 











The second countervailing hypothesis suggests that in markets with a less 
competitive banking environment, potential entrants or existing SMEs face 
greater difficulty gaining access to credit than markets in which banking is more 
competitive. This hypothesis was tested by Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), who 
found that market power may reduce the entry of small firms to the market. 
Banks with market power will be more willing to lend to their established 
borrowers than to the new borrowers. “The value of a bank’s current lending 
relationships will depend on the future profitability of its borrowers, which in turn 
depends on prospective entry and growth of new competitors. A bank’s incentive 
to support the profitability of its older clients could thus restrain its willingness to 
extend credit to potential industry entrants (or emerging small firms).” By testing 
this hypothesis, Cetorelli and Strahan confirmed that the less competitive the 
conditions in the credit market, the lower the incentive for lenders to finance start-
ups or informationally opaque SMEs.  
However, not only the amount of available information in the region or 
degree of bank competition affect the number of loans to SMEs, but a bank’s 
performance by itself matters. Another hypothesis that was tested by the 
economists is that banks in the state of financial crisis have little chance of 
providing loans to small businesses. These banks would reduce lending volumes 
for potentially risky firms with high information asymmetry.  
According to Kimball, successful bank operation requires managers to 










have increasingly adopted innovative performance metrics, which assist 
managers in making these difficult and complex decisions. Among the large set 
of measures for banks’ performances, a distinction can be made between 
traditional, economic, and market-based measures of performance. 
Traditional performance measures are return on assets (RoA), return on 
equity (RoE), cost-to-income, and net interest margin. For example, Revell 
(1980) uses the interest margin as a performance index for U.S. commercial 
banks. He defines the interest margin as the difference between interest income 
and expense divided by total assets8.  
Economic measures of performance reflect the economic profit generated 
by a firm, in contrast to the firms accounting earnings. The most commonly cited 
indicators here are economic value added (EVA), developed by Stern and 
Stewart in 1991, and risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC).  First measure, 
EVA, “takes into account the opportunity cost for stockholders to hold equity in a 
bank, measuring whether a company generates an economic rate of return 
higher than the cost of invested capital in order to increase the market value of 
the company.”9 The second measure, RAROC, was first implemented by 
Banker’s Trust and it can be described as the excess return on the market per 
unit of market risk. Similar to EVA, this measure takes into account the bank’s 
cost of capital. However, RAROC goes further because it adjusts the value-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Measurement of bank performance in Greece, Kyriyaki Kosmidou, Constantin Zopounidis, 
South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 1 (2008) 79-95 











added in relation to the capital needed. Unfortunately, it is difficult to calculate 
RAROC without having access to internal data.  
Market-based measures of performance characterize the way the capital 
markets value the activity of any given company, compared with its estimated 
accounting or economic value. The most commonly used measures include 
“price-to-earnings ratio”, “price-to-book value”, “total share return”, “credit default 
swap”. 
Despite the continuous use of financial ratios for analysis of banks’ 
performance, federal regulators in USA developed the CAMEL rating system, 
which is capable of showing the over-all performance of a bank. In 1979, the 
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System was adopted to provide federal 
bank regulatory agencies with a framework for rating financial condition and 
performance of individual banks. Since then, the use of the CAMEL factors in 
evaluating a bank’s financial health has become widespread among regulators.10 
The CAMEL rating system was developed by federal banking regulators 
as a composite measure of overall commercial bank performance.11 The CAMEL 
acronym stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, 
Liquidity, and Sensitivity.  
Several academic studies have examined whether CAMEL model is useful 
for determining the performance of a bank. Most of these studies conclude that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 CAMELs and Banks Performance Evaluation: The Way Forward, Wirnkar Alphonsius 
Dzeawuni Sr., Dr. Muhammad Tanko II, June 24, 2008 
11 Efficiency Ratios and Community Bank Performance, Fred H. Hays, 










CAMEL ratings are highly useful in the supervisory monitoring of bank 
conditions.12 This paper will use approximate CAMEL variables in order to 
measure bank performance in different counties. 
After examining the existing literature it is necessary to uncover the link 
between market “thickness” in terms of economic activity, address the 
importance of small banks competition in the lending process, and finally the 
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3. Data and Empirical Model  
 
Data on small business finance are scarce. One of the few available 
sources is the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), a nationally 
representative sample of non-financial, non-farm small businesses sponsored by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Small 
Business Administration.13  
This paper uses data for U.S. commercial banks over the period of 1999 
through 2006 from the FDIC's Report of Condition and Income (Call Reports), 
made available from the Federal Reserve Bank. The Call Report is used as the 
source for loans to small businesses, which are defined as commercial loans with 
original amounts less than one million dollars.  
Following Nakamura (1994) this paper categorizes banks with assets 
greater than $1 billion as large banks and those with assets less than $1 billion to 
be small banks. Due to all previous studies on the role of small and large banks 
in lending to SMEs, the decision in this study is to focus on small bank lending. 
Specifically, “because big banks are run from afar, it is expensive for them to 
obtain the qualitative information about risk that local bankers pick up naturally by 
being part of the community and interacting with borrowers.” 
 The data for the paper was stratified by region: metro, micro, and rural 
counties. In addition, those banks with missing or unusable data were eliminated 
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from the sample. The data includes 35,442 small banks, of which 3,686 banks 
were located in metro counties, 12,739 in micro counties, and 19,017 in rural 
counties. Other regional data that was used as control variables in the model can 
be categorized as data representing economic the condition of the county and 
market “thickness” indicators. 
3.1. Control variables 
	  
This paper includes a number of variables to control for the factors that 
could affect the amount of small business loans. These variables and the 
rationale for including them in the analysis are presented below. 
3.2. Regional economic and banking conditions 
 
 This paper uses U.S. county data, representing a mixture of economic 
and banking conditions in the county level: population, income per capita, human 
capital, number of banks, the amount of deposits per capita, and the amount of 
assets per capita. Income and population data were collected from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  
This paper uses years of schooling as a proxy for human capital. This 
technique was introduced by George W. Hammond and Eric C. Tompson in 2007. 
“Years of schooling in a county are calculated based on high school and college 
attainment rates from the Census of Population. In particular, years of schooling 










given level of educational attainment by the assigned years of schooling. College 
graduates or higher are assigned 17 years of schooling, while high school 
graduates who did not complete college were assigned 13 years of schooling, 
and persons who did not complete high school were 10 years of schooling. 
These weighted years of schooling are then summed for the county.14 “The data 
was collected for the year 2000 from the U.S. Bureau of the Census website. 
Another variable, the “assets,” is calculated as the sum of all the banks’ 
assets in the county divided by the population. This paper uses dividends per 
capita as a substitute for the assets in the second run of the regressions to see 
whether short term liability affect bank propensity to lend. The “number of banks” 
variable is the total number of banks operating in the county. It was normalized 
by the number of small business establishments per county. 
3.3. Market “thickness” 
 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of 
information externality on the county level, and how these externalities affect 
small business lending. This paper tests the hypothesis that markets with a 
greater amount of information available regarding previous economic activity will 
receive also a greater volume of loan origination in that county. Births (new firm 
openings) and deaths (firms that went out of business) of small businesses are 
used as a proxy for variables that have to reduce informational asymmetry in the 
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region and help bank analysts to make decisions in their lending practices. These 
measurements were taken from the Census and normalized by the number of 
firms in the county–BIRTHNORM=Births/Firms and DEATHNORM=Deaths/Firms. 
Another variable that was used in the analysis is the number of small businesses 
normalized by the population. This variable describes the density of SMEs by the 
population in the county, which may be used to determine the degree of market 
“thickness.”  
3.4. Banks’ loan performance factors 
 
 We used the charge-off ratio as a measure of banks’ portfolio 
performances that might affect management incentives in making and pricing 
loans to the informationally opaque small businesses. The charge-off ratio is the 
ratio of the total amount of loans written off during a period to the total 
outstanding amount of loans at the end of the period. It shows how “successful” 
the bank is in its risk management practice. More precisely, it measures what 
part of given loans is unlikely to be collected. 
Here the hypothesis tests the idea that banks with low portfolio 
performance coefficients are risk adverse in practice and issue fewer loans to 
risky businesses because of the bank’s unstable financial situation and inability 
to cover the charge-offs that might occur from these risky projects. However, 
there is also the possibility of risky management practice in the same situation. 










expected returns. For the purpose of this paper we will focus primarily on the risk 
adverse behavior, while still examining both possibilities. All data for the 
calculation of the Charge-off ratio were taken from FDIC's Report of Condition 
and Income (Call Reports), 1999-2006. 
Another variable that was used in this paper is Performance Index. It 
utilizes linear multivariate efficiency ratios. In addition to profitability as measured 
by return on average assets, other important variables include salaries to 
average assets, the liquidity ratio, the equity capital to asset ratio, and loan 
charge-offs to loans. The final linear discriminant model contains the following 
five ratios: 
,  where: 
 = Constant 
E2TA= Equity Capital to Total Assets     
NCO2L= Net Loan Charge-offs  to Loans    
SalAA= Salaries and benefits to Avg. Assets    
ROAA= Return on Average Assets     
LiqR= Liquidity ratio   
3.5. Time period effects 
	  
	  
Because bank performance and lending practice varies over the business 
cycle, we control for potential differences by including separate dummy variables 










3.6. Descriptive statistics 
	  
The sample includes 3,110 counties, of which 1,062 are metro counties, 
676 are micro counties, and 1,372 are rural counties. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the variables in the regression: 
Table 1 
Variable	   Mean	   Median	   St. Dev.	   Max	   Min	  
Economic conditions	  
Income per capita	   25059.67	   24018	   6554.2	   119141	   451	  
Population	   101450	   25191.5	   577099.5	   34440167	   45	  
Human Capital/Population	   0.208	   0.21	   0.024	   0.994	   0	  
Total Assets	   2919445	   181165.	   4788400	   2561386761	   0	  
Number of banks/Number of SMEs	   0.0001	   0.00005	   0.00017	   0.00214	   0	  
Unemployment rate	   5.23	   5	   2.07	   30.6	   0	  
Market “thickness” factors	  
 
Firm Births	  
241	   52	   866.94	   29971	   0	  
Firm Deaths	   218	   50	   773.14	   25160	   0	  
SMEs per county (F)	   2294	   549	   7594.9	   238829	   0	  
Birthnorm=B/F	   0.1	   0.09	   0.029	   0.5	   0	  
Deathnorm=D/F	   0.09	   0.09	   0.027	   0.66	   0	  
Number of loans $250,000 through 
$1,000,000	  
113.53	   9	   793.41	   50165	   0	  
Amount of loans $250,000 through 
$1,000,000	  
34198.3	   2708.5	   237574.5	   9571065	   0	  
Number of banks/Number of SMEs	   0.000114	   0.00005	   0.00017	   0.00214	   0	  
Amount of loans $250,000 through 
$1,000,000/Number of SME	  
10.3	   3.84	   21.7	   801.69	   0	  
Number of loans $250,000 through 
$1,000,000/Number of SME	  
0.03	   0.01	   0.08	   5.3	   0	  
SME/Population	   0.0235	   0.0226	   0.078	   0.097	   0	  
Banks’ loan performance factors 
Charge-Off Index	   0.16	   0.0024	   9.211	   0.99	   0	  











Table 2, Table 2, and Table 4 present descriptive statistics for metro, 
micro, and rural counties respectively. 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Metro Counties 
Variable	   Mean	   Median	   St. Dev.	   Max	   Min	  
Regional economic and banking conditions	  
Income per capita	   28334.88	   26978	   7605.3	   111346	   451	  
Population	   247892.5	   92527	   969528.4	   34440167	   1699	  
Human Capital/Population	   0.203	   0.206	   0.024	   0.99	   0.0038	  
Number of banks/Number 
of SMEs	  
0.00005	   0.00002	   0.000078	   0.00078	   0	  
Total Assets	   8039647.8	   399143	   81695378	   2561386761	   0	  
Unemployment rate	   4.8	   4.7	   1.7	   30.1	   0	  
Market “thickness” factors	  
Firm Births	   595.3	   212	   1407.78	   29971	   0	  
Firm Deaths	   534	   193	   561	   25160	   0	  
SMEs per county (F)	   2294	   549	   7594.9	   238829	   0	  
Birthnorm=B/F	   0.1	   0.1	   0.02	   0.3	   0	  
Deathnorm=D/F	   0.09	   0.09	   0.01	   0.56	   0	  
Number of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000	  
294.05	   32	   1336.3	   50165	   0	  
Amount of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000	  
88551.82	   9684	   400389.3	   9571065	   0	  




10.3	   3.84	   21.7	   801.69	   0	  




0.036	   0.016	   0.1	   5.3	   0	  
SME/Population	   0.019	   0.017	   0.005	   0.032	   0	  
Banks’ loan performance factors 
Charge-Off Index	   0.26	   0.003	   12.92	   1.1	   0	  











Summary Statistics for Micro Counties 
Variable	   Mean	   Median	   St. Dev.	   Max	   Min	  
Regional economic and banking conditions	  
Income per capita	   24310	   23850	   5155	   119141	   9262	  
Population	   45649	   38237	   49107	   1158277	   405	  
Human Capital/Population	   0.205	   0.207	   0.02	   0.28	   0.008	  
Total Assets	   471349.4	   259763	   1250568.4	   25428432	   0	  
Number of banks/Number 
of SMEs	  
0.00008	   0.000051	   0.00012	   0.001372	   0	  
Unemployment rate	   5.34	   5.2	   2.05	   25	   0	  
Market “thickness” factors	  
Firm Births	   103.67	   79	   165.8	   4451	   0	  
Firm Deaths	   97	   77	   135.8	   3385	   0	  
Firms per county (F)	   1098	   904	   1309.8	   32043	   3	  
Birthnorm=B/F	   0.09	   0.08	   0.023	   0.5	   0	  
Deathnorm=D/F	   0.08	   0.086	   0.02	   0.57	   0	  
Number of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000	  
38	   15	   107.48	   4264	   0	  
Amount of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000	  
11261.3	   4709.5	   25101.9	   615088	   0	  




10.94	   5.59	   18.92	   343.84	   0	  




0.035	   0.018	   0.06	   2.14	   0	  
SME/Population	   0.00025	   0.000132	   0.00051	   0.01	   0	  
Banks’ loan performance factors 
Charge-Off Index	   0.19	   0.35	   3.39	   1.67	   0	  













Summary Statistics for Rural Counties 
Variable	   Mean	   Median	   St. Dev.	   Max	   Min	  
Regional economic and banking conditions	  
Income per capita	   22893.8	   22323.5	   5122.6	   100711	   5355	  
Population	   15589.8	   11697.5	   26364.04	   840785	   45	  
Human Capital/Population	   0.214	   0.215	   0.024	   0.39	   0.1	  
Number of banks/Number of 
SME	  
0.00018	   0.00013	   0.000225	   0.002141	   0	  
Total Assets	   162343.1	   100131	   250106.7	   7058741	   0	  
Unemployment rate	   5.5	   5.1	   2.27	   30.6	   0	  
Market “thickness” factors	  
Firm Births	   35.36	   23	   86.31	   3208	   0	  
Firm Deaths	   34	   24	   72.57	   2526	   0	  
Firms per county (F)	   365.33	   262	   693.2	   24098	   0	  
Birthnorm=B/F	   0.09	   0.09	   0.034	   0.66	   0	  
Deathnorm=D/F	   0.09	   0.09	   0.035	   0.66	   0	  
Number of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000	  
10.98	   2	   24.77	   830	   0	  
Amount of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000	  
3427.08	   368.5	   7516.48	   233549	   0	  
Amount of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000/Number 
of SME	  
9.6	   1.38	   20.6	   636.37	   0	  
Number of loans $250,000 
through $1,000,000/Number 
of SME	  
0.03	   0.005	   0.067	   2.26	   0	  
SME/Population	   0.024	   0.023	   0.009	   0.097	   0	  
Banks’ loan performance factors 
Charge-Off Index	   0.007	   0.001	   0.028	   0.76	   0	  
Performance index	   0.27	   0.35	   0.15	   0.61	   0	  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 The metro counties in the sample have on average of $88.5 million in 
total loans to SMEs from the small banks, micro counties have $11 million, and 










amount in metro counties is $9.7 million, in micro counties it is $4.7 million, in 
rural counties it is $0.36 million. This reflects a skewed distribution of small 
business loans. The average number of small business loans per year is 294 for 
metro counties, 38 for micro counties, and 11 for rural counties. Also, 
approximately 55% of the sample banks are located in metropolitan areas, 18% 


























4. Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Using these data, we tested the following hypotheses. The first test tries to 
examine the relationship between the degree of bank competition in local 
geographic banking markets and the volume of SME lending in those markets. 
It is conventional wisdom to believe that greater competition is associated 
with a greater supply and lower prices; specifically, higher number of banks in the 
market is associated with higher small business loan volumes and lower interest 
rates. However, some studies have results that show that it is not always the 
case. In particular, Petersen and Rajan (1995) found that for young small 
businesses, increases in the concentration of the banking market in which the 
firm was headquartered reduced the firm’s loan interest rate. But, if they were 
older, increases in concentration increased their loan interest rate. This suggests 
that if a small business is young enough, increases in concentration increase its 
loan amount, but that if it is older, the loan amount falls. This result does not tell 
us, however, whether on average, increases in competition in a banking market 
would be expected to be associated with increases or decreases in small 
business loan volume in the market as a whole. 
To evaluate the relationship between competition and lending more 
carefully, we conducted a regression analysis to control more for the age of 
SMEs, specifically for the number of start-ups in a county. These variables were 










other variables that may influence small business loan volume, such as general 
economic conditions of the county, which are measured by income, population, 
human capital, and unemployment rate. All these variables were included in the 
model that tries to test the hypothesis, which seeks to uncover the correlation 
between banks’ competition and SMEs lending. Specifically, this suggests that 
small firms in areas with few small banks should be more credit constrained and 
receive smaller amounts of loans than small businesses in the counties with 
more small banks. Also, regions with a robust network of small local banks 
should have significantly more small firms and a larger amount of loans than 
regions with a few small banks. 
The second hypothesis deals with the notion of asymmetry of information 
and market “thickness.” A large number of articles have shown that asymmetric 
information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending, leading to credit 
rationing and living behind the most informationally opaque borrowers—SMEs 
and start-ups. The paper argues that in markets with a greater amount of 
previous information available regarding economic activity there is also a greater 
volume of loan origination in that geographic area.  Banks and lending institutions 
see this previous information regarding economic success and failure as a signal 
for loan determination. It implies that counties with a high level of small business 
economic activity should be more likely to obtain credit from banks than counties 
with economic activity being low. This paper uses the number of start-ups and 










activity. Specifically, the paper tests whether a larger volume of small business 
activity in the county leads to a larger volume in SME lending. 
The third test examines the distribution of loans from financially distressed 
banks. The hypothesis states that counties with banks in financial distress 
receive relatively smaller amounts of loans to SMEs than counties that have 
banks with better financial performance. There are two countervailing forces 
when dealing with this issue. On the one hand, small banks in distress may 
become more risk adverse and will not be willing to lend to potentially risky SMEs. 
On the other hand, these banks may want to increase their profits by investing in 
risky projects that require a higher interest rate, thus providing more profit to 
financially distressed banks. This paper uses two variables that measure the 
financial condition of the bank. The first index is a Performance Index. It utilizes 
linear multivariate efficiency ratios. The hypothesis stated in this paper implies 
that banks with a higher performance index will be more willing to lend to small 
businesses or start-ups because they can afford to offset the losses from these 
risky projects. 
The second variable that is used as a proxy for measuring the financial 
performance of the bank is a Charge-Off ratio. This index measures the gross 
credit loss of a loan portfolio over a specified period of time. Our hypothesis 
suggests that the banks with this ratio being low will lend more to the SMEs than 










lending performance will be more risk adverse and will not lend to the 
informationally opaque small businesses and start-ups that are more risky. 
The other control variables in the regression are income per capita, the 
amount of assets per capita, amount of deposits per capita, human capital, and 
unemployment rate. This paper predicts positive impact of assets, income, and 
human capital on the number of loans to SMEs. As it was written before, the 
paper tries to prove the correlation between the level of economic activity in the 
county and the amount of small business loans in this county.  The growth in 
assets, income, and human capital implies the growth of economic activity of the 
county, thus implying the higher number of loans to small businesses. Table5 
summarizes all hypotheses that are tested in the paper. The predicted outcomes 
are always represented by the alternative hypothesis - . 
Table 5 
Hypotheses	   All counties	  
Term	   	   	  
Regional economic and banking conditions:	  
Income per capita	   0≤ 	   >0	  
Human Capital/Population	   0≤ 	   >0 	  
Assets/Population	   0≤ 	   >0	  
Number of banks/Number of SMEs	   0≤ 	   >0	  
Unemployment Rate	   	  >0	   0≤ 	  
Deposits/Population	   0≤ 	   >0	  
Market “thickness” factors	  
Number of SME/Population	   0≤ 	    >0	  
Births/Number of SMEs	   0≤ 	    >0	  
Deaths/Number of SMEs	   0≤ 	    >0	  
Banks’ loan performance factors	  
Charge-Off Index	   	  >0	   0≤ 	  












To test these implications, we first use data for all counties and conduct an 
econometric panel data model with it. In addition, we are going to conduct 
another three tests.  The first test is focusing on metro counties, the second 
focuses on micro counties, and the third examines the lending practices in rural 
counties. A metropolitan area contains a core urban area of 50,000 or 
more population. A micropolitan area contains an urban core of at least 
10,000, but less than 50,000, population. And a rural area contains the area of 
less than 10,000 in population. This will allow us to investigate how does lending 
behavior change across the size of the county or its geography. Specifically, the 
significance of market thickness factors or local economic conditions may vary 
across the counties depending on their size. For example, paper hypothesizes 
that in rural counties the relationship lending is the most important factor in 
lending process and the local economic conditions and the degree of business 
activity does not play the same role as they may play in metro counties where the 



















5. Empirical analysis 
 
 
This paper estimates the model using data from 3110 counties in the 
United States. We find mixed results regarding whether the regression outcomes 
support the stated hypotheses. This suggests that aggregation of all counties in 
the regression may ignore important information and may alter the results.  
Therefore, it is necessary to test for the structural differences between 
varying sizes of regional economies: metro, micro, and rural counties and 
whether it is meaningful to aggregate all sizes of counties in one data set. By 
conducting disaggregated tests on metro, rural, and micro counties it is possible 
to investigate how county size impacts lending. Then, we compared the results 
from the regression that uses aggregated set to the results from three 
disaggregated subsets. Given this comparison data can be used to analyze the 
significance county size has.  After conducting tests on the micro, metro, and 
rural counties independently, it is apparent that aggregation neglects the 
differences amongst the size of the counties and that geography appears to be a 
significant factor in the analysis.  Table 6 reports fixed-effect panel results for the 
aggregated set, which includes all counties. The results from the tests using 
metro, micro, and rural counties are presented in the Table 7. Table 8 provides 


















	   	   SE	   t-stat	  
Regional economic and banking conditions	  
Human Capital/Population	   .0001357   	   .0001359     	   1.00   	  
Unemployment Rate	   0.111	   0.0962	   1.15	  
Income per capita	   4.79e-07 	   3.39e-07     	   1.41   	  
Assets/Population	   -1.72e-08   	   2.00e-08    	   -0.86   	  
	   	   	   	  
Number of banks/Population	   3.27379** 	    .7423867     	   4.41   	  
Deposits/Population	   -6.75e-09   	   2.07e-08    	   -0.33   	  
Market “thickness” factors	  
Number of SME/Population	   -.0194621**  	   .0038359    	   -5.07   	  
Births/ number of SME	   .007308   	   .0182932     	   0.40   	  
Deaths/ number of SME	   .0236297   	   .0179589     	   1.32   	  
Banks’ loan performance factors	  
Charge-Off Index	   5.17e-07   	   1.64e-06     	   0.31   	  




	   Metro counties	   Micro counties	   Rural counties	  
 
(within)	  




stat	   	  
SE	   t-
stat	   	  
SE	   t-stat	  
Regional economic and banking conditions	  
Human 
Capital/Population	  
-15.54	   14.84	   -
1.05	  
57.39**	   25.05	   2.29	   0.1025 **	   0,0485 	   2.11   	  
Unemployment 
Rate	  
0.3	   0.21	   1.41	   0.29	   0.19	   1.49	   0.1373	   0.12	   1.14	  























08    	  
52.77	  








0.32   	  
.0503**   	   .0135 	   3.71   	   -9.12e-10	   1.39e-08	   -0.07	  
Number of 
banks/population	  
-1549.53	   2333.4	   -
0.66	  
3400.8**	   1588	   2.14	   110.757***   	   10.6970	   10.3
5   	  
Market “thickness” factors	  
Births/ number of 
SME	  
-24.14	   11.98	   -1.8	   28.88**	   9.55	   3.02	   -.0068003   	   .014195
8    	  
-0.48   	  
Deaths/ number of 
SME	  
14.05	   12	   1.17	   -2.67	   9.52	   -
0.28	  
.0132108   	   .013951
5     	  
0.95   	  
Number of 
SME/Population	  
92.83**	   25.02	   3.71	   -0.0095	   0.05	   -
0.17	  
.5263883   	   .304361
4     	  
1.73   	  
Banks’ loan performance factors	  




0.26	   .0040209   	   .016400
3     	  
-1.38	  
Performance Index	   0.227**	   0.047	   4.76	   0.05	   0.016	   0.31	   .0562206**
*   	  
.009622
6     	  










Table 8. Elasticity 
Variable Metro counties Micro counties Rural counties 
Income per capita 1.259e-07 -1.904e-08 4.567e-09 
Assets/Population 1.288e-06 0.00020 -1.0443-11 
SME/Population -0.1239 -0.0141 0.003955 
Banks/Population 1.1733 0.9976 1.0377 
Human capital/Population 4.071e-08 -1.463e-07 0.0003647 
Charge-Off Index 0.000091 2.415-06 0.000339 
Perforance Index -0.000148 -4.272e-06 0.00050659 
Birthnorm=Births/Firms 0.0154 0.012599 0.00012115 
Deathnorm=Deaths/Firms -0.00667 -0.000221 0.00012115 
Deposits/Population -3.377e-07 0.000227 -8.510e-12 
 
The results of the test show that the coefficients of assets and deposits 
per capita are positive and significant for micro counties (the population varies 
between 50,000 and 10,000 people per county.) With regard to the metro 
counties, the results suggest that bank’s assets per capita and short-term 
liabilities don’t affect the bank’s propensity to lend in these counties. The same 
results appear to be true for rural counties. However, the assets per SME have 
positive and significant effect on SME lending in all three types of counties. This 
result is in line with the predictions of the hypothesis. The intuition behind this 
outcome is that the small community banks with high amounts of assets per SME 
are more likely to lend more to informationally opaque small businesses and 










risky projects. In addition, those banks holding more assets are better able to 
diversify their portfolios, which in turn, can lead to more aggressive and risky 
investments in SME or start-ups. 
The number of banks variable is positive and statistically significant in 
micro and rural counties. These results support the hypothesis of this paper that 
in markets with a less competitive banking environment, potential entrants or 
existing SMEs face greater difficulty gaining access to credit than markets in 
which banking is more competitive. These results also imply that market power 
may reduce the entry of small firms in the market, where relationship lending 
takes place, namely – in micro and rural areas. Banks with market power prefer 
to lend to their established borrowers rather than to the new borrowers, as it is 
more costly for banks to establish new relationship than maintain the old ones.   
Another variable—human capital—has a positive sign and is significant for 
rural and micro counties, however, is not significant for metro counties. Therefore, 
small counties with high human capital are more likely to attract a greater number 
of loans. This result may also imply that more human capital in areas that have 
less economic activity increases attractiveness of the area in regard to SME 
lending.  
The unemployment rate does not play the major role in the SME lending 
activity. The coefficient for the unemployment rate appears to be insignificant for 
all regression results. Income per capita is significant in rural counties only, 










than the counties with the low income per capita. The rural counties with high 
income per capita will provide safer environment for investment. This result goes 
along with a human capital effect, where rural counties with higher amount of 
human capital will be viewed as more stable, less risky investment. 
The bank’s performance factors give mixed results across different 
counties. The charge-off index is significant and negative for metro counties. The 
negative effect can be explained by risk-adverse behavior of small banks. Small 
banks cannot afford to take a risk of lending to obscure small businesses or start-
ups as a result of their financial situation and inability to recoup the future losses 
with their assets.  In contrast, the charge-off index does not affect the lending 
practices in rural and micro counties.  
When using Bank’s Performance index as a second measure of banks 
financial standing the hypothesis stated that the banks, who have better overall 
financial performance, also have higher propensity to lend to SMEs. The results 
suggest that in the metro counties banks are more open to the risky investment 
or they have enough profit to offset the future losses.  Specifically, the beta 
coefficients for metro and rural counties are positive and have significant impact 
on the number of small business loans, while it is insignificant for micro counties.  
The possible explanation for these results can be derived from the 
financing policies in the specific counties or regions. It is likely that there are 
different policies concerning financing of SMEs. They may change across sectors, 










may give subsidiaries to SMEs through the community banks. In this case, even 
though the investment in informationally-opaque small business may appear 
risky to the bank, it will give required amount of loan to the SME.  However, this 
may disproportionally affect small banks because of the fixed costs of these 
policies. The existence of such policies can be the reason why the charge-off 
index in the rural counties doesn’t have a negative influence on the amount of 
loans given to small enterprises.  
Another hypothesis that was tested in this paper deals with the notion of 
asymmetry of information and market “thickness.” The idea here is that in 
markets with a greater amount of previous information available regarding 
economic activity there is also a greater volume of loan origination in that 
geographic area.  Banks and lending institutions see this previous information 
regarding economic success and failure as a signal for loan determination. 
Specifically, the counties with a high level of small business economic activity 
should be more likely to obtain credit from banks than counties with economic 
activity being low. The factors used in this paper that may reduce information 
asymmetry and determine the level of market “thickness” are number of start-ups, 
the number of closeouts of small businesses, and the total number of the SME 
per county normalized by population. We find mixed evidence on whether these 
factors can reduce asymmetry of information. The number of start-ups appears to 
have a significant positive effect in micro counties.  Also, the number of small 










counties. Both of these variables have insignificant coefficients for the rural 
counties. These results could indicate that in rural counties small firms have 
stronger relationships with their banks, consistent with a prediction of relationship 
effect, presented by Petersen and Rajan. In the larger counties the information 
concerning the birth and death of small businesses and the density of SME can 
be used as a proxy for the market “thickness” measurement. These factors can 





















It is a common theory that SMEs lack hard quantitative information about 
their performance, which creates lending barriers. The aim of this paper was to 
uncover the factors that may be used as an informational signal for the banks 
and may induce the amount of loans to SMEs on the county level.  
We used three different types of factors that may influence the banks’ 
willingness to lend to the informationally opaque small enterprises—the regional 
economic and banking conditions in a county, the small business activity in the 
county, and the banks’ financial condition. We test the hypotheses using Call-
Report data from the Federal Reserve Bank from 1999 to 2006. Specifically, we 
conduct four sets of tests, which include metro, micro, rural, and overall county 
data. Using these sets of data we tested the significance of different economic 
variables in SME lending behavior across the regions. The first group of variables 
describes the economic condition of the county—income per capita, number of 
banks in the county, amount of assets per county, amount of deposits per capita, 
unemployment rate, and human capital per capita. The results of the tests 
indicate that the number of banks in the county and human capital have a 
positive effect on the number of SME loans given in small—micro and rural— 
counties. Firstly, higher bank competition produces larger amounts of small 










and significant effect in small counties as well. Therefore, banks in small counties 
with high human capital are more likely to lend more to the SMEs.  
 Another hypothesis that was tested in this paper states that the number of 
loans given to small businesses is also connected with the notion of market 
“thickness” and the degree of business activity presented in a county. This paper 
tests to what extent the market “thickness” matters in bank lending practices. In a 
region with higher economic growth, a higher amount of SME loans is expected. 
This may indicate that the regions, where the business is expanding, will attract 
more small business loans. Of consideration is whether the information about the 
business activity in the county can induce banks to favor specific counties with a 
relatively higher degree of market “thickness.” The number of births and deaths 
and the density of small businesses per population in the county are used as a 
proxy to measure market “thickness.” The number of births and the density of 
SME appear positive and significant for large counties, which suggests that 
banks do, in fact, value this information in a highly competitive business 
environment. In the rural counties, however, these variables are not significant. 
This lack of significance can be explained by the prevailing importance of 
relationship lending practices in the regions with a relatively small number of 
SMEs and higher market power of banks.  
The third hypothesis tested in this paper deals with the financial 
performance of banks. The tests showed that in the metro and micro counties 










small businesses. In rural counties, however, the charge-off index appears 
insignificant. This may be due to the various policies that were established in 
order to support small businesses in the rural counties. These policies may 
provide subsidiaries for SMEs, so that whether lending bank is in financial 
distress is not as important. The overall bank performance has a positive impact 
on both – small and large counties, suggesting that the banks. This result even 
further supports the hypothesis that “successful” banks will be willing to lend to 
the small informationally-opaque businesses because it is easier for them to 
recoup the possible losses. 
Overall, the paper confirms the importance of economic regional factors 
when dealing with SME lending. Through understanding the influence of these 
factors on small business lending, economists can develop effective practices 
that will support SME growth. In turn, this will encourage regional economic 
development and middle class society.  
 
